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Problem area 
The EUROCONTROL Airport 
Operations Programme (APR) is 
providing stakeholders with 
documentation and support for safe, 
cost-effective and efficient airport 
operations. Within this work 
programme the potential of 
Advanced Surface Movement 
Guidance and Control Systems 
(A-SMGCS) to increase safety and 
maintain throughput in all weather 
conditions is investigated. 
Currently, airport operations under 
low visibility conditions are still 
based on procedures and working 
methods without automation 
support. 
 
Description of work 
The National Aerospace Laboratory 
of the Netherlands (NLR) together 
with their partners from the German 
Aerospace Centre (DLR) carried 
out research activities on the 
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candidate concepts for advanced 
operations with A-SMGCS 
surveillance under low visibility 
conditions as part of the 
EUROCONTROL APR. During 
dedicated interviews and workshops 
with stakeholders, candidate 
concepts were selected based on 
criteria for usability, safety, human 
factors, and cost-benefit. Two 
candidate concepts, named Virtual 
Block Control and Separation 
Bubble Alerting, emerged and were 
evaluated in full-scale human-in-
the-loop real-time simulations of 
Rotterdam Airport on the NLR 
ATM Research Tower Simulator 
(NARSIM Tower) platform. 
 
Results and conclusions 
The study showed that a 
combination of the two tower 
control concepts can indeed 
improve efficiency of operations 
under low visibility conditions. The 
designed interface prototypes are 
flexible and inexpensive tools that 
should be developed further. 
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Virtual Block Control and Separation Bubbles  
in ATC Low Visibility Operations 
Dipl.-Ing. Jürgen Teutsch, National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR), Amsterdam, Netherlands 
Dipl.-Ing. Vilmar Mollwitz, German Aerospace Centre (DLR), Braunschweig, Germany 
 
Abstract 
The EUROCONTROL Airport Operations 
Programme (APR) is providing stakeholders with 
documentation and support for safe, cost-effective 
and efficient airport operations. Within this work 
programme the potential of Advanced Surface 
Movement Guidance and Control Systems 
(A-SMGCS) to increase safety and maintain 
throughput in all weather conditions is investigated. 
Currently, airport operations under low visibility 
conditions are still based on procedures and 
working methods without automation support. 
The National Aerospace Laboratory of the 
Netherlands (NLR) together with their partners 
from the German Aerospace Centre (DLR) carried 
out research activities on the selection and 
evaluation of candidate concepts for advanced 
operations with A-SMGCS surveillance under low 
visibility conditions as part of the EUROCONTROL 
APR. During dedicated interviews and workshops 
with stakeholders, candidate concepts were selected 
based on criteria for usability, safety, human 
factors, and cost-benefit. Two candidate concepts, 
named Virtual Block Control and Separation 
Bubble Alerting, emerged and were evaluated in 
full-scale human-in-the-loop real-time simulations 
of Rotterdam Airport on the NLR ATM Research 
Tower Simulator (NARSIM Tower) platform. The 
study showed that a combination of the two tower 
control concepts can indeed improve efficiency of 
operations under low visibility conditions. The 
designed interface prototypes are flexible and 
inexpensive tools that should be developed further. 
Introduction 
ATC Low Visibility Operations 
ICAO Annex 3 defines visibility for 
aeronautical purposes and also provides a definition 
for the prevailing visibility to account for different 
values at different locations on the aerodrome 
surface1. Still, such definitions are not clearly 
addressing operational issues.  
For take-off and landing operations, Runway 
Visual Range (RVR) more appropriately provides 
pilots, air traffic service (ATS) units and other 
aeronautical users with information on runway 
visibility conditions during periods of low visibility. 
This is thoroughly described in the ICAO RVR 
Manual2. Nevertheless, RVR does not account for 
separation issues on the remaining airport surface. 
Finally, the ICAO A-SMGCS Manual 
(Appendix A) introduces four visibility conditions 
(VC), each addressing a certain operational 
condition rather than a measured visibility value3. 
Even though it will be difficult to determine 
whether such visibility conditions actually prevail 
on the airport surface, their definition is important 
for assessing adequate operational procedures.  
VC1 and VC2 are defined as good visibility 
conditions where separation responsibility still rests 
with the pilots. Visibility from the tower is reduced 
in VC2. In VC3, visibility further deteriorates such 
that pilots cannot avoid collision with other traffic 
on taxiways and at intersections by visual reference. 
However, pilots are able to taxi by visual reference, 
meaning that they can discern guidance elements or 
specific locations on the airport surface. This 
condition is usually referred to as low visibility and 
more or less corresponds to a RVR between 400 
and 75 meters. In VC4, visibility is insufficient for 
the pilot to taxi by visual guidance only. This 
condition occurs at RVR values below 75 meters. 
Low Visibility Research Focus 
According to the A-SMGCS Manual 
(Appendix A), visibility conditions, traffic density 
and aerodrome layout are decisive factors when 
making a choice on which A-SMGCS level should 
be implemented at an airport3. Clearly, 
improvements in VC4 will only be brought about 
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traffic display, traffic conflict monitor, etc.). Such 
technology is only foreseen for advanced levels of 
A-SMGCS. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether 
such technology will be available and implemented 
in all commercial aircraft any time soon. 
As a consequence, EUROCONTROL started 
investigating A-SMGCS (Level 1) surveillance 
improvements. Traditional non-cooperative 
surveillance systems at the airport, such as the 
surface movement radar (SMR), are enhanced with 
cooperative surveillance systems, such as 
multilateration (MLAT). This will not only provide 
unambiguous identification of the targets and 
provide the controller with a labelled display of the 
traffic situation but also lead to improved accuracy. 
Several airports, such as London Heathrow, 
Amsterdam Schiphol, and Zurich Airport, already 
introduced such surveillance technology. This only 
led to small changes in the procedures for VC1 
(visually perceived traffic picture is confirmed) and 
VC2 (mandatory position reports become obsolete 
with the exception of initial identification) as pilots 
or vehicle drivers are still able to avoid collision. 
Thus, they are also still responsible for separation 
on the ground. Procedures at airports are essentially 
the same as with SMR according to ICAO4, and in 
consequence, they are the same as without MLAT.  
In VC3, when pilots or vehicle drivers can 
navigate on the airport surface but visibility is not 
sufficient to avoid collision, controllers switch over 
to procedural control. Therefore, on most airports 
aircraft or vehicles will only move in one defined 
section of the airport at a time and will be 
controlled as such. An aircraft or vehicle will only 
be permitted to enter a clearly defined airport 
section (e.g. taxiway segment separated by stop 
bars) after this section has been cleared by all other 
traffic. This leads to an enormous reduction in 
efficiency and airport capacity.  
Thus, EUROCONTROL initiated a project for 
procedural improvements in VC3. NLR with 
support from the German sister institute DLR 
carried out this research project under the AT-One 
framework, which was set up to facilitate and 
bundle ATM research efforts in the Netherlands and 
Germany. The following chapters show the results 
of a feasibility study for several candidate concepts, 
as well as further evaluation and initial validation 
activities for the two most promising concepts. 
Candidate Concepts 
As part of the EUROCONTROL APR, 
operational experts from European industry and 
research institutes discussed numerous approaches 
for finding operational solutions to the negative 
effects of low visibility conditions at airports. They 
tried to investigate ways to improve efficiency and 
capacity of operations given the current restrictions 
that apply in these conditions. Input was received 
from ANSPs, ICAO3, and the EMMA5 project, 
which is the major European A-SMGCS research 
initiative, co-sponsored by the European 
Commission.  
As a result of the discussions and the input 
provided, EUROCONTROL and AT-One experts set 
up a list of candidate concepts that were considered 
viable options for further research. These concepts 
are shortly introduced. 
Multiple Line-up (ML) 
ANSPs considered the possibility of using 
multiple line-ups for take-off during low visibility 
conditions provided that the A-SMGCS enhanced 
surveillance allows controllers to determine all 
aircraft positions. It was assumed that this 
procedure could lead to more capacity in low 
visibility conditions when applied in mixed-mode 
runway operations.  
Virtual Block Control (VB) 
The Human-Machine Interface (HMI) of the 
Ground and Runway Controller could be enhanced 
with virtual stop bars in the taxiway structure. 
Virtual stop bars do not exist on the airport surface 
but are displayed to the controller on a surveillance 
display. Aircraft could be controlled in sequence 
from one virtual stop bar to the next in analogy of 
the block control procedure used in the UK. The 
VB procedure could be investigated in combination 
with several alerting functions (e.g. for minimum 
separation, stop bar crossing, runway entry).  
Convoy Operations (CO) 
The idea of convoy operations was introduced 
although, strictly speaking, the definition of VC3 
would not allow for such a procedure. In convoy 
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segment. While the first aircraft in the convoy 
would receive guidance instructions from the 
controller, the aircraft in sequence would follow 
their predecessor at a distance that is judged safe by 
the pilots. Such a procedure is already applied in 
better visibility conditions at some airports. In VC3, 
the procedure could additionally be monitored by 
A-SMGCS enhanced surveillance and alerting 
functions or a combination thereof.  
Parallel Push-backs (PP) 
Another procedure considered by ANSPs for 
VC3 was the parallel push-back procedure, which is 
frequently applied in good visibility. If two aircraft 
that are parked next or opposite to each other leave 
at the same time, they could be pushed back or 
pulled simultaneously. As the tower cannot see the 
push-back in VC3 and the pilots cannot avoid 
collisions, responsibility would need to shift to the 
ground staff performing pushing and towing 
operations. Thus, procedures would require close 
co-ordination between platform operators, airlines 
and the tower. The procedure could provide higher 
airport throughput and could form the starting point 
for convoy operations and virtual block control. 
Separation Bubbles (SB) 
A significant increase in airport throughput 
under low visibility conditions could be achieved 
when procedural separation by means of segmented 
taxiways is replaced with longitudinal spacing by 
so-called separation bubbles. Aircraft would 
maintain a specific minimum distance to each other 
ensured by an imaginary safety bubble around the 
aircraft. The algorithm for that bubble and the 
minimum distances should be determined according 
to ICAO3 (Ch. 3.4.4.3 and Ch. 3.4.4.4). Other 
applicable parameters could be the initial speeds 
and decelerations of aircraft, pilot and controller 
reaction times, and system reaction times. The 
controller would conduct longitudinal spacing using 
the tool, which issues a warning when aircraft 
bubbles touch and separation minima are violated.  
Taxiway Conflict Monitoring (TCM) 
In addition to receiving warnings of 
longitudinal spacing minima violations, controllers 
should also be warned well in advance of other 
possible conflicts which can easily be overlooked 
when concentrating on a specific aircraft pair or 
convoy. A Taxiway Conflict Monitor that warns 
controllers of head-on conflicts and potential 
infringements of on-ground separation was 
prototyped by NLR in early A-SMGCS studies. It is 
based on a taxiway structure with virtual blocks 
(not displayed on the controller screen) and works 
as a safety net in the background. The software is 
extrapolating surveillance data across the block 
boundaries to detect potential conflicts.  
Selection Process 
Based on initial concept descriptions of 
abovementioned candidate concepts, AT-One 
carried out a feasibility study6 incorporating the 
results of stakeholder interviews and workshops, an 
initial safety analysis, a procedure analysis, and 
cost-benefit considerations. The study derived at 
conclusions regarding the practicability of each 
concept and gave recommendations regarding the 
concepts that should be considered for further 
evaluation and validation.  
Additional Concept Options 
In the course of the feasibility study, it was 
realized that separation bubbles and taxiway 
conflict monitoring were actually two safety nets 
sharing common issues and features. Therefore, it 
was decided to merge the two options and look at 
the separation bubble concept as a concept for both 
conflict monitoring in the maneuvering area and 
longitudinal spacing. This reduced the number of 
concept options to five. These options were ordered 
according to perceived complexity of the solution 
and discussed with an emphasis on human role and 
HMI. Thus, the new list reads as follows: 
• Virtual Block Control 
• Separation Bubbles 
• Multiple Line-up 
• Convoy Operations 
• Parallel Push-back 
For the VB concept, it was suggested to 
increase the situational awareness of pilots by 
marking position references on the ground, such as 
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Additional monitoring software could watch aircraft 
passing stop bars without clearance. However, it 
would still have to be determined whether the 
available surveillance data would provide 
sufficiently stable and precise position values. 
For the SB concept, it was suggested that the 
bubbles should be fixed to the aircraft symbol and 
displayed on the radar screen to assist controllers in 
the separation task. Lateral separation could be 
indicated by the bubble width. This needed further 
investigation for crossing traffic, though. Also 
proper training and tuning of the tool would be 
required 
For the ML concept, an important remark was 
that a pilot should always be able to visually 
identify the aircraft lined up in front. Clearly, in low 
visibility, it would be difficult to meet this 
requirement, as there might be too much distance 
between the different runway entry points. Control 
procedures would not have to change, as it was 
expected that aircraft and other traffic are presented 
clearly and unambiguously on the surveillance 
screen. Generally, however, safety concerns were 
quite high. 
For convoy operations, it was considered 
unnecessary to develop an HMI. In order to 
establish a convoy, aircraft would have to be guided 
to taxi in or out simultaneously. While the first 
aircraft in the convoy would receive the guidance 
information, other aircraft would be required to 
establish visual contact and follow the preceding 
aircraft. An obvious weakness of the concept in low 
visibility would be the uncertainty whether 
distances can be accurately judged by pilots to 
guarantee safe operations. Also fallback procedures 
would need to be in place in case pilots lose visual 
contact. Finally, convoy operations would be 
limited to an appropriately simple airport layout 
with long and uninterrupted taxiway stretches. 
Parallel push-backs in visibility condition three 
could be performed under the supervision of 
platform marshals, supposed that visibility on the 
apron is good enough to visually identify other 
traffic and obstacles. However, concerns about 
safety of the procedure and clear responsibilities 
were quite high. Again, the procedure would 
depend on an appropriate airport layout that allows 
for this kind of operation. Procedure or HMI 
changes for controllers were not foreseen. 
Conclusions of the Feasibility Study 
One of the major conclusions of the feasibility 
study was that, considering the different kinds of 
benefits that could be expected for the different 
concepts, it would only make sense to look at 
appropriate combinations of concepts into an 
overall concept. This quickly led to the formation of 
two groups of concepts, namely VB as a control 
concept in combination with SB as a safety net, and 
the combination of PP, CO, and ML as a concept 
for outbound operations with most control activities 
being reduced to traffic monitoring. 
In spite of the obvious advantages of the 
combined PP, CO, and ML concept regarding cost 
and development work, the combined VB and SB 
concept was considered the most promising concept 
for improved VC3 operations and was suggested for 
further research activities after completion of all 
analyses and stakeholder consultation activities. 
This was mainly due to the uncertainties for the PP, 
CO, and ML procedures regarding roles and 
responsibilities of involved actors and expected 
safety concerns. Above that, these procedures were 
based on conditions closer to VC2 than VC3. They 
were not expected to lead to large improvements in 
VC3 when compared to VB and SB. 
At the end of the feasibility study, it was 
recommended to further investigate the Virtual 
Block and Separation Bubble concepts. For the VB 
concept, it was suggested to also look at aspects of 
dynamically placing block boundaries and to 
particularly study workload issues. For the SB 
concept, several options could be studied, such as 
the use as control tool or use as a safety net. The 
combination of VB and SB in a single concept was 
seen as a promising option. According to the study, 
highest priority for follow-on research had to be 
given to testing HMI solutions and a-priori user 
acceptance (pilots and controllers). Demonstrations 
and real-time simulations should validate the 
concepts and give guidelines for further conceptual 
development. Procedures should be subject to 
further and more detailed safety assessments. As 
part of future investigations, it was also considered 
interesting to validate separation standards for 
aircraft on the airport and study pilot reactions in 
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Detailed Concept Description 
The project following the feasibility study had 
to define VB and SB concepts in more detail and 
prepare and carry out evaluation and initial 
validation exercises in a real-time simulation 
environment7. 
When applying Virtual Block Control the 
Traffic Situation Display (TSD) of ground and 
runway controllers is enhanced with so-called 
virtual stop bars, which means that these stop bars 
are additionally introduced for controller reference 
but do not exist on the airport surface (Figure 1). 
Thus, the concept aims to reduce block sizes 
thereby improving taxiing throughput. Like in 
ordinary block control, which ensures spacing 
between aircraft in VC3 and is described in the 
SMGCS Manual8, an aircraft needs to leave its 
block before another aircraft is allowed to enter that 
same block.  
 
Figure 1. Virtual Block Control 
Virtual stop bar violations (illegal crossings) 
were to be indicated by visual and aural alerts, 
which would require a certain accuracy of the 
surveillance system. In the simulations, it was 
assumed that the surveillance system had sufficient 
accuracy.  
During stakeholder workshops and interviews 
it was eventually determined that virtual stop bars 
should be positioned statically at predetermined 
locations, not dynamically at random locations. 
Dynamic aspects of virtual stop bars could be better 
implemented as so-called Watch Dogs. The last 
aspect should be seen as a replacement of the 
possibility of placing stop bars on the airport layout 
at unknown locations and, thus, without position 
reference. Placing stop bars dynamically would 
make it rather impossible for pilots to navigate to 
the clearance limit as long as no other technology 
(such as a moving map display) was involved. 
Instead, controllers had the possibility to attach a 
so-called Watch Dog to an aircraft needing special 
attention. As soon as such an aircraft started to 
move, the Watch Dog produced the same alarm as a 
virtual stop bar violation. 
The basic idea of Separation Bubbles is to 
create an artificial bubble around an aircraft the size 
of which primarily depends on aircraft speed 
(Figure 2). That bubble can function as a buffer 
zone to prevent collisions on taxiways. Depending 
on whether the bubble is shown to the controller or 
not, the controller could use this tool for either 
enhanced control as in the case of virtual blocks or 
as an additional safety net. When the bubbles are 
shown they would indicate separation as do the 
blocks. The controller then has to monitor the 
bubbles of all aircraft taxiing on the movement area 
and has to advise aircraft to stop or taxi slower 
whenever two bubbles are about to touch. This 
would allow more than one aircraft in one block at a 
time (given that the block is bigger than the safe 
separation indicated by the bubbles) and thus would 
increase capacity. The disadvantage of the bubbles 
being shown permanently would be that they could 
clutter the controller display. Above that, clearance 
limits would be missing by definition.  
v1 v2
 
Figure 2. Separation Bubbles 
Thus, after a workshop at EUROCONTROL and 
first evaluation sessions with controllers, it was 
decided not to display bubbles and use them as a 
safety net only. This meant that audio and visual 
alerts were given when two bubbles touched. 
The original idea was to base the bubble size 
on different parameters such as speed, deceleration, 
pilot and controller reaction times, jet blast and 
braking margins, in accordance with ICAO3. 
Nevertheless, during implementation of the 
separation bubble software and during stakeholder 
workshops it was found that the same safety net 
effect could be accomplished by considering a static 
bubble size for a taxi speed of 15 knots and 
projecting it to a future position by multiplying a 
look-ahead time with the current speed. In that way, 
bubbles were also adapted to the taxiway layout, i.e. 
they followed the taxiway structure and divided into 
branches at intersections. It was also mentioned 
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parameters will need fine-tuning for each airport 
depending on the actual taxiway layout and that 
their application on the apron area will need even 
more careful fine-tuning because of the density of 
the route net. Therefore, the separation bubbles 
were not applied in the apron area during the 
evaluations exercises. 
Furthermore, a number of decisions and 
assumptions relevant for executing the real-time 
simulations were made:  
• Rotterdam Airport (EHRD, RWY06/24, 
2200 x 45 m), as implemented on the 
NARSIM Tower platform, was chosen as 
simulation environment 
• On-board guidance was not simulated 
• Pilots were assumed to be able to identify 
virtual stop bar locations visually 
• No additional R/T phraseology was used  
• No system input was given with clearances 
• Controllers decided on activated stop bars 
• Automatic re-illumination of stop bars  
The last aspect needs some explanation. 
Automatic re-illumination of a virtual stop bar 
means that as soon as an aircraft crossed the stop 
bar it was illuminated again as an additional safety 
precaution. However, there was no automatic 
switching for convoy operations in a runway queue 
(if an aircraft has passed a virtual stop bar and left 
the block, the stop bar re-illuminates and the next 
stop bar in the queue would be switched off, and so 
forth). This was considered unsafe.  
A number of important functionality 
requirements were determined during initial HMI 
evaluations and led to the following decisions 
concerning the two concepts: 
• Virtual stop bars were implemented for 
both runway configurations (even if only 
configuration RWY 24 was used) 
• Different audio alerts were used for the 
different types of stop bars (runway and 
taxiway/watch dog) and separation bubbles 
• A conflict list was implemented presenting 
conflict information for all tools (type, 
involved call signs and acknowledge field) 
Simulation Environment 
Simulation Platform 
The simulation platform for the evaluation of 
low visibility procedures for Virtual Block Control 
and Separation Bubbles and for an initial validation 
of operational improvements was the NARSIM 
Tower environment. NARSIM Tower is a highly 
realistic and flexible simulation environment and is 
used for training Dutch air traffic controllers and for 
prototyping of new tools. NARSIM Tower was 
considered an ideal platform for prototyping, 
evaluation and initial validation. 
Alerting services for Taxiway Conflicts 
(Hermes: patron of travellers), Stop Bar Violations 
(Cerberus: guard of Hades) and Watch Dog 
Functionality (Pallas: goddess of strategic warfare) 
were running at the experiment leader position. 
Actual alerts, however, were presented on the 
Surface Movement Radar (SMR) display at both 
controller positions (including audio). Apart from 
the SMR, the runway controller had a Terminal 
Approach Radar (TAR) screen and the emulated 
display of instruments with meteorological and 
communication information. The ground controller 
had an SMR available that is identical to the one 
used by the runway controller (virtual bars could be 
switched at both positions). Additionally, the 
ground controller had a Closed Circuit Information 
System (CCIS) display (with ATIS and 
meteorological information) and an Electronic Data 
Display (EDD) with flight information.  
Experiment Participants 
The main actors in the real-time simulation 
exercises were the tower controllers, i.e. the ground 
controller for the apron area and the taxiways and 
the runway controller for RWY 24. Clearance 
delivery (start-up) was pre-scripted and simulated 
by the NARSIM Tower validation platform. The 
overall objective for the ground controller was to 
ensure the safe and efficient conduct of ground 
maneuvering. The overall objective for the Runway 
Controller was to ensure the safe and efficient 
conduct of flights on the runway and in the air 
within the area of responsibility of the tower. 
There were two controller teams consisting of 
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Rotterdam Airport and were employees of LVNL, 
the Dutch Air Navigation Service Provider. They 
had experience with the Rotterdam Tower working 
environment. Two other controllers came from 
Stockholm Arlanda Airport and were employees of 
LFV, the Swedish Air Navigation Service Provider. 
They had no experience with the Rotterdam Tower 
working environment but received familiarization 
training by the Rotterdam controller team.  
The Stockholm controllers had previously 
worked with parts of an A-SMGCS (MLAT). The 
Rotterdam team had no working experience with an 
A-SMGCS, but took part in evaluation sessions as 
part of this project and also had experience with the 
NARSIM Tower validation platform. They used it 
and worked with it as instructor for basic and 
recurrence training for Rotterdam Airport. 
The pseudo-pilots participating in the 
simulations were pilots in training from the KLM 
Flight Academy (KLS).  
Relevant Human-Machine Interfaces 
Virtual blocks were created by virtual stop bars 
on the SMR display, also called Traffic Situation 
Display (TSD). Figure 3 shows part of the SMR 
screen that was available at both controller 
positions. Active virtual stop bars were indicated in 
red and green (stop and cleared) and inactive virtual 
stop bars were grayed out. Virtual stop bars could 
be switched from red to green and vice versa by 
left-clicking on the pan handles and activated or 
deactivated with the context menu by right-clicking 
on the pan handles. Locations for virtual stop bars 
were chosen during earlier evaluation sessions. 
Only a single real stop bar exists at Rotterdam 
Airport at high speed exit V3. This stop bar was 
indicated by a thick red bar at the exact position.  
Runway stop bars were unidirectional, 
meaning that they only caused an alert when an 
aircraft tried to cross an illuminated (red) virtual bar 
to enter the runway. This also applied for the real 
stop bar. Runway stop bars were under 
responsibility of the runway controller.  
Taxiway stop bars, which were used for virtual 
block control, were under responsibility of the 
ground controller (depending on the procedures 
used and the point of transfer of responsibility this 
could change, though). Stop bar violations were 
indicated by a red label and an audio alert. 
 
Figure 3. Virtual Stop Bars on the SMR 
The Watch Dog functionality monitors an 
aircraft that is instructed to hold its position. It 
could be activated and deactivated by left-clicking 
on the respective aircraft label (or alternatively 
through the context menu).  
The Watch Dog had four different states: 
activated, guarding, alarm, and resolved. An 
activated Watch Dog is indicated by a white circle 
around the aircraft. The Watch Dog starts guarding 
(orange circle) an aircraft when it stands still but 
can be activated while it is still rolling. If it 
continues to roll or starts to move, there is an alarm 
which is indicated by a red circle and an orange 
label (Figure 4) as well as an audible alert. If the 
problem is resolved (aircraft stops moving), the 
alarm disappears (green circle).   
 
Figure 4. Watch Dog and Stop Bar Violation 
The orange label color for Watch Dog 
violations was chosen after the training exercises as 
controllers felt that stop bar violations needed more 
attention (red label color) than Watch Dog 
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Watch Dog and stop bar violations are shown in 
Figure 4. 
Taxiway conflict monitoring was performed by 
the Hermes service that used the separation bubble 
tool to calculate and predict a possible conflict on 
the taxiways (see Figure 5 for bubble visualization 
at the experiment leader position and Figure 6 for 
the same situation on the SMR). Taxiway conflicts 
detected by the separation bubble algorithm (track 
enters a projected bubble) were indicated on the 
SMR with an orange label for the conflicting 
aircraft and an audio alert.  
 
Figure 5. Separation Bubble Visualization 
 
 
Figure 6. Separation Alert on SMR 
The separation bubble tool had many settings 
regarding bubble size, location, and the look-ahead. 
Many rules could be configured, e.g. rules for 
probability thresholds and hysteresis (an idleness 
threshold that accounts for sensitivity) of alarms9. 
The main settings tested and confirmed by 
controllers during the training runs were a bubble 
length of 110 meters, a bubble width of 40 meters, 
and a bubble offset (from the center) of 25 meters. 
The look-ahead time was set to 35 seconds to 
prevent nuisance alerts in the virtual block on TWY 
V between V1 and Holding 24, and at line-up of 
Holding 24 (see indications on Figure 4). A look-
ahead distance was not used (it had a value of 0 
meters). The probability threshold was set at 0.5 
(with the probability being a function of basic 
elements such as aircraft speed and taxiway 
segment geometry). Hysteresis values were set at 
0.9 times the bubble size (alarm on) and 1.2 times 
the bubble size (alarm off) respectively.  
At the runway controller position an additional 
Terminal Approach Radar (TAR) screen was 
available that could be used to keep an eye on 
departure separations and, more importantly, 
runway approach separations. As a general rule, 
aircraft were not cleared for line-up with an 
approaching aircraft flying within 6 NM of the 
runway threshold. 
Traffic Samples 
Different traffic samples were produced for 
training runs, evaluation runs, and the performance-
related initial validation runs (baseline and 
advanced). While the training scenarios started with 
comparatively lower traffic volumes (20 aircraft 
movements per hour), both evaluation and 
performance related simulations had a rather high 
traffic load (28 to 34 aircraft movements per hour). 
There was a clear focus on outbound traffic 
(between 20 and 24 outbounds offered per hour).  
Simulation Measurements 
Subjective measurements from the 
participating controllers were obtained in the form 
of standard pre-experiment and post-experiment 
questionnaires.  
Additionally, after each evaluation and each 
performance-related run with the tools, controllers 
had to fill in questionnaires concerning aspects of 
system usability (SUS scores). Furthermore, 
questionnaires on the assessment of expected 
operational improvements (OI and AL scores), such 
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situational awareness and human error, were filled 
in. 
A set of standard questionnaires1 from the 
Solutions for Human Automation Partnership in 
European ATM initiative (SHAPE) developed by 
EUROCONTROL and addressing human factors 
related issues were also part of the post-run 
assessment. The SASHA questionnaires assessed 
the level of controller situational awareness during 
the preceding simulation run. The SATI 
questionnaires assessed the controller level of trust 
in the system in the preceding simulation run. Trust 
is defined as the extent to which a user is willing to 
act on the basis of external information, 
recommendations, actions and decisions of another 
person, a computer-based tool or a decision aid. 
Finally, the AIM-s questionnaires assessed the 
impact of various ATC tasks in the preceding 
simulation run on controller workload. 
General debriefing took place in the form of 
interviews in order to clarify questionnaire results 
and see whether there were any changes in the 
perception of controllers regarding the tools. 
Regarding simulation system data, the 
NARSIM standard set of parameters was recorded. 
This set contained all the data necessary to make a 
replay of the scenarios, i.e. mainly aircraft positions 
(state), related frequency, and R/T times. 
Concept Evaluation Results 
The evaluation runs were carried out with each 
tool in isolation (virtual stop bars and Watch Dog 
functionality is considered a single tool) and in 
combined operation in order to investigate how the 
tools are used most effectively.  
The three evaluation runs were performed in 
the following order:  
• E1: Separation Bubbles 
• E2: Virtual Block Control and Watch Dog 
• E3: Combination of Tools 
Critical situations were introduced in order to 
get an idea about the consequences for safety and 
the impact on ground handling efficiency.  
                                                     
1 Available on the EUROCONTROL website (November 2008) 
After experimenting with tools and operations 
in the evaluation session, controllers were asked 
questions concerning usability of the tools and the 
choice that should be made regarding the use of 
tools under advanced operational conditions during 
the performance-related simulations. 
Furthermore, SHAPE questionnaires were 
filled in and scores were calculated. These scores 
provided insight into the controllers’ perception of 
their own situational awareness, mental workload, 
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Figure 7. System Usability Scores (Evaluation) 
The system usability scores were generally 
high but there was a noticeable difference in 
opinion between controllers regarding the use of the 
tools (see Figure 7).  
Deeper analysis showed that the controller 
attributing higher scores was especially pointing out 
ease of use and quick learnability of the systems, 
while the other controller had doubts about whether 
he would like to use the system frequently and 
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Automation trust scores more clearly showed 
the difference in opinion (see Figure 8). While 
generally there seemed to be agreement that Virtual 
Block Control scored higher in automation trust 
than Separation Bubbles, the consequences for the 
tool combination were not as clear.  
Analysis of the answers showed that none of 
the scores of the second controller was lower than a 
value of 2. Thus, the controller attitude could be 
described as indifferent rather than negative. Also, 
it had to be considered that the general score level 
for the second controller was lower throughout all 
SHAPE and SUS questionnaires.  
Both scores for situational awareness and 
mental workload did not differ very much. As none 
of the values had any statistical relevance, it should 
suffice at this point to mention that the general level 
for situational awareness was high with an average 
rating of 4.9 out of 6, ranging from 4.6 (E3) to 5.2 
(E2), and that the general level for mental workload 
was low with an average rating of 1.9 out of 6, 
ranging from 1.8 (E2) to 2.0 (E1). 
Due to the fact that controller scores on 
automation trust differed, the evaluation debriefing 
and interviews with controllers had to elaborate 
why there was disagreement about the combined 
tool option.  
In conclusion, the debriefing revealed that 
controllers felt that: 
• Separation bubbles alone are less effective 
than virtual blocks as regards trust, 
situational awareness and mental workload 
• Virtual blocks used in isolation are very 
effective as regards trust, situational 
awareness and mental workload when used 
procedural 
• Combination of tools is deemed necessary 
when higher throughput is to be achieved 
(deviate from procedural control with 
virtual blocks and use separation bubbles 
as safety net when aircraft are taxiing 
somewhat closer within one virtual block) 
• When used with current EHRD (good 
visibility) operations separation bubbles 
result in too many alerts (even though the 
alerts are considered valid) 
• Use of Watch Dog as dynamic block on 
taxiways (Figure 9) is considered a safety 
risk (in case of R/T failure and/or with a 
missing clearance limit) 
 
Figure 9. Use of Watch Dog on TWY V 
Controllers had no doubts about the decision to 
continue working with the tool combination. During 
the evaluation interviews a number of statements 
were made that are considered of importance in this 
regard: 
• Virtual blocks offer controllers a more 
structured and safe working approach 
under low visibility 
• Separation bubbles should be used as extra 
safety net when procedural control with 
virtual blocks is gradually lifted to allow 
for more throughput 
• Watch Dog should only be used on the 
apron or after a stop bar violation 
• Current EHRD (good visibility) operations 
should change under low visibility (exit 
via V4 instead of V3, when using exit V3 
do not hold aircraft at virtual stop bar N) 
• Making tools dependent of each other (no 
separation alerts across illuminated stop 
bars) could pose a safety risk 
Initial Concept Validation Results 
After the evaluation session, an initial 
validation of the tool combination was carried out 
with the previously tested procedures. Results were 
analyzed with a focus on human performance, 
usability, achieved capacity, R/T load, and general 
operational issues. 
The baseline scenarios were carried out 
without virtual block control and separation bubble 
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there is no SMR at Rotterdam). Two procedural 
options were simulated: 
• B1: follow ICAO regulation, i.e. one 
aircraft moves at a time and SMR screen is 
not used for control (separation of aircraft) 
• B2: do follow own intuition, i.e. work as 
efficient and safe as deemed necessary, 
and use the SMR screen for control 
(separation of aircraft) 
The advanced scenarios were run with the tool 
combination several times to get a good indication 
of achievable capacity and efficiency: 
• A1 to A4: different traffic scenarios with 
the same amount of traffic (about 30 
aircraft per hour, inbound plus outbound) 
In the baseline situation only situational 
awareness and mental workload questionnaires 
were filled in as all other questionnaires concerned 
the use of the tools in one way or another.  
Each of the mentioned scenarios was carried 
out twice, i.e. once for each controller team. 
Human Perception Results 
The SHAPE scores provided insight into the 
controllers’ perception of their own situational 
awareness, mental workload, and automation trust. 
Although not much could be deduced from the 
questionnaires from a statistical viewpoint (limited 
number of runs and participants), they at least 
indicated the generally perceived levels. 
A trend in the automation trust score was a 
general learning curve from one advanced run to the 
next (see also Figure 10). Average values in overall 
SATI scores ranged from 4.8 (A1) to 5.6 (A3) with 
an overall mean of 5.3 on a scale from 0 to 6. In 
fact, most of the operational imprecision and 
mistakes (not adhering to approach spacing limits, 
not strictly performing block control) were 
observed during the first run (A1) for both 
controller teams.  
Major differences between controller roles 
could not be found. It seemed though, that the 
ground controller was more skeptical in terms of 
trusting automation than the runway controller, 
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Figure 10. Automation Trust Scores for the 
Advanced Validation Runs 
Also situational awareness scores and mental 
workload scores showed the same kind of 
stabilization or learning curve. However, due to the 
low number of runs and participants, this fact 
should not be overrated.  
Average values in SASHA scores ranged from 
4.9 (A1) to 5.6 (B1) with a mean value of 5.4 on a 
scale from 0 to 6. Average values in AIM-s scores 
ranged from 1.1 (A4) to 1.7 (A1) with a mean value 
of 1.5 on a scale from 0 to 6. 
Surprisingly, there was no significant 
difference between the baseline and the advanced 
runs regarding the general level of situational 
awareness and mental workload perception, even 
though controllers noted in interviews and 
debriefings that especially virtual block control 
would lead to safer operations and less workload. 
This could mean that the controllers’ perception of 
safety and the controllers’ workload for conflict 
scanning on the monitor, which is part of the overall 
workload, is not captured accurately by the SHAPE 
questionnaires.  
But also for these scores deeper analysis 
showed that, especially in the case of workload, 
there was too much noise in the data, caused by 
learning curve, controller task, or traffic sample.  
System usability values showed no clear 
difference in any of the advanced runs. The score 
was generally high. Average values ranged from 4.4 
(A2) to 4.7 (A3) with a mean value of 4.5 on a scale 
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Operational Assessment Results 
The first simulation run (A1) was an outlier 
regarding operational performance for both 
controller teams. This result was also reflected in 
the more complex questionnaires concerning 
operational improvements and an assessment of the 
alerting tools. Overall scores showed the same 
results as in all other questionnaires (see Figure 11 
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Figure 11. Operational Improvement Scores for 
Advanced Validation Runs 
Average values in Operational Improvement 
scores ranged from 4.4 (A1) to 4.8 (A3) with a 
mean value of 4.7 on a scale from 1 to 6.  
Average values in Alerting Tool Assessment 
scores ranged from 3.8 (A1) to 4.3 (A3) with a 
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Figure 12. Alerting Tool Assessment Scores for 
Advanced Validation Runs 
Operational improvement and alerting tool 
questionnaires were additionally analyzed deeper 
by segregating the questions into different 
categories, each addressing a specific aspect. 
Questions were answered on a scale of 1 to 6 (from 
no agreement to complete agreement). Average 
values per category are reported.  
Operational Improvements Score
Tools do not impair safety: 5.2 
Tools allow handling more traffic: 4.9 
Tools do not increase average stop time: 3.9 
Tools increase traffic throughput: 4.2 
Tools reduce human error: 5.1 
 
This means that while controllers were very 
positive about the tools being able to reduce human 
error, handle more traffic, and not contributing 
negatively to safety, they were more skeptical about 
the reduction in average stop time and an increase 
in throughput. This was reflected in the interviews. 
Alerting Tool Assessment Score
Tools identify conflicts in time: 4.3 
Presentation of conflict unambiguous: 4.8 
False alert number sufficiently low: 4.2 
Alerts only on taxiways are useful: 4.9 
Use alerting under better visibility: 3.4 
Two stages of alerts are useful: 2.3 
 
Thus, there was a clear preference for as few 
alerts as possible (with only one kind of alert) and 
the use of tools under low visibility conditions only. 
Further, there was general agreement and values for 
alerting tool performance were high.  
R/T Assessment Results 
One of the system measurements made during 
the simulation runs was the number and duration of 
R/T calls. 
Again A1 was an outlier with one of the 
controller teams having operational difficulties 
(procedure familiarization) in the beginning, which 
caused a higher R/T load (see Figure 13). As could 
be expected, the number of R/T calls did not differ 
too much between the second baseline and the 
advanced runs, especially when considering that 
perceived workload was the same. 
The average value for B1 was at 117 calls per 
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per hour. The latter did not differ much from the 
average value for the advanced runs, which was at 
301 calls per hour (291 without run A1). 
Number of R/T Calls per Team 
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Figure 13. R/T Calls in Baseline and Advanced 
Validation Runs 
Capacity Assessment 
Another system measurement made was the 
number of inbounds and outbounds within the 
simulation time, the so-called achieved capacity or 
runway throughput. Again values did not differ too 
much between B2 and the advanced runs (see 
Figure 14). A1 did not seem to be an outlier this 
time, which means that the operational difficulties 
controllers experienced in the first run did not 
prevent them from achieving the average capacity 
level. 
Achieved Capacity or Number of Aircraft 
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Figure 14. Achieved Capacity for Baseline and 
Advanced Validation Runs 
The average value for B1 was at 11 aircraft per 
hour and the average value for B2 was at 29.5 
aircraft per hour. The latter did not differ much 
from the average value for the advanced runs, 
which was at 29 aircraft per hour.  
Considering a number of observed operational 
mistakes these numbers might be corrected by 1 to 
2 aircraft, which would more or less level results at 
10 aircraft per hour for B1 and 30 aircraft per hour 
for all other runs.  
In other words, with the exception of B1, the 
number of aircraft offered in the traffic scenarios 
could indeed be handled by the controllers. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The study for evaluation and initial validation of the 
VB and SB concepts found that low visibility 
procedures differ per airport. It was highly 
recommended to harmonize and standardize VC3 
operations across airports, and to promote 
application of Virtual Block and Separation Bubble 
Control as a means to increase airport capacity in 
VC3 in a safe way. ICAO should be advised. 
Virtual Blocks with Virtual Stop Bars and 
Separation Bubbles provided an operational concept 
with additional safety nets (for illegal stop bar 
crossings and separation alerts as well as a Watch 
Dog for specific monitoring purposes) that, 
according to controllers, reduced their perceived 
workload for monitoring traffic. 
With baseline operations making use of SMR 
information for separation, both controller groups 
could manage the same amount of traffic as when 
using the Virtual Block Control and Separation 
Bubble tools (about 30 aircraft per hour). As 
compared to the current procedure at Rotterdam 
Airport, having no SMR and following ICAO 
recommendations, capacity was increased by a 
factor of three2. 
In-depth Safety Assessment 
The next recommended step in the Virtual 
Block Control and Separation Bubble concept 
development is to perform an in-depth operational 
safety assessment making use of the results reported 
here, including an additional safety analysis of 
cockpit operations in VC3. 
                                                     
2 N.B.: the difference in capacity is mainly due to current safety 
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Virtual Block Control 
Virtual Block Control procedures are identical 
to procedural control with position reporting. 
Virtual blocks offered controllers a more structured 
and safe working approach under low visibility. 
Virtual blocks and virtual stop bars were considered 
a solid operational and procedural framework that 
improves controller situational awareness and 
reduces workload. Overall the Virtual Block 
Control concept was appreciated and well-received.  
The positioning of virtual stop bars is a matter 
of careful design. Already in an early stage of the 
evaluation, it was decided to prefer virtual stop bars 
close to crossings and intersections. This improves 
pilot situational awareness because pilots will still 
be able to visually identify the holding position. 
The situational awareness aspect for pilots will be 
further investigated in cockpit simulations as part of 
the described study.  
If there are too many virtual stop bars, there 
will be administrative delay, i.e. workload to 
implement stop-and-go instructions will increase. 
Fast-time simulations should be executed to reveal 
how virtual block size and the number of virtual 
stop bars will affect flow and capacity.  
When operating virtual blocks, there must 
always be a clearance limit for aircraft. When 
clearance limits are clearly defined, traffic will 
remain well-separated, even when communication 
is no longer possible. For capacity reasons, 
however, it is sometimes preferred to have two 
aircraft in the same block. In discussions it was 
concluded that procedures should only allow one 
aircraft per block at a time. 
Separation Bubbles 
Separation Bubbles alert controllers when 
separations between aircraft are violated. They act 
as an additional safety net underneath present day 
taxi operations and should be used when procedural 
control with virtual blocks is gradually lifted to 
allow for more airport throughput.  
Separation Bubbles alone are less effective 
than Virtual Block Control as regards trust, 
situational awareness and mental workload, though. 
The bubbles worked well on taxiways and 
crossings, but on aprons they caused too many 
nuisance alarms. Separation Bubbles could be tuned 
for that purpose, but this would require setting local 
separation standards for different parts of the 
aerodrome. 
Separation Bubbles caused nuisance alerts 
when the distance between reporting points was too 
small. Thus, procedures should be tested on their 
compatibility with separation standards carefully, 
before the system is brought into operation.  
The bubbles provided additional safety at any 
time, even across illuminated virtual stop bars or 
when two aircraft are controlled within one large 
block. If virtual block sizes are too small, 
Separation Bubbles might cause alerts that are 
perceived as nuisance by the controller. It was 
considered unsafe to include knowledge about 
illuminated virtual stop bars in the Separation 
Bubble tool as a stop bar violation alert might be 
too late for controller action. Thus, it is 
recommended to carefully choose block sizes in 
accordance with the agreed local separation 
standards. 
Combination of VB and SB 
Although the combination of Virtual Block 
Control and Separation Bubble tools scored 
somewhat lower on the system usability scale, their 
combination was deemed necessary. Separation 
Bubbles will serve as an additional safety net that 
warns controllers of separation violations between 
aircraft. This warning may come earlier than a stop 
bar violation alert. Thus, the use of the tool 
combination is recommended.  
Small virtual blocks may trigger unwanted 
alerts by Separation Bubbles. While separation 
violations between aircraft in different blocks 
should not go unnoticed, it will be necessary to 
create blocks that are large enough to separate 
aircraft with the agreed separation limits. Reducing 
the nuisance by limiting look-ahead time was 
considered dangerous. 
Watch Dog Tool 
The concept of a Watch Dog tool was 
developed to be able to dynamically place a Virtual 
Stop Bar in the movement area of the airfield. The 
procedure was to drop a Virtual Stop Bar in front of 
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Virtual Stop Bar. Early evaluation concluded that 
this procedure required too much interaction and 
that it was better to surround an aircraft with a 
circle that watches whether the aircraft stops within 
a certain time and continues to monitor the aircraft 
to hold its position. This circle was called Watch 
Dog and was evaluated together with Virtual Block 
Control in the simulation sessions. Operationally, it 
was used to split a long taxi stretch, thereby 
effectively dividing it into two separate virtual 
blocks. That, however, was considered a safety risk. 
When communication failed controllers could not 
prevent collision because of a missing clearance 
limit and reference point for the pilot. Thus, the 
only operational use of a Watch Dog had to be a 
situation in which a violation had already occurred 
and aircraft had to be monitored more closely. 
Therefore, the Watch Dog should be used after 
illegal virtual stop bar crossings only. When aircraft 
cross a virtual stop bar without a clearance, they 
would receive an extra hold instruction and the 
Watch Dog would be placed around them to 
monitor the situation. This operation was 
considered by controllers to have a safety benefit. 
The Watch Dog monitor could also be used to 
simply hold any aircraft in the movement area, e.g. 
on the apron. But it was not used much in this way. 
It was primarily used as a second line of defense, 
i.e. after an illegal virtual stop bar crossing. 
Concept Improvement 
Apart from the local tuning issue for the 
Separation Bubbles, the concepts were considered 
rather mature for operational use. Virtual stop bars 
should be positioned with care, if possible, on the 
basis of fast-time simulation results (for flow and 
capacity issues, i.e. workload), and on the basis of 
dynamic risk modeling or further real-time 
simulations (for tuning of separation violation tools, 
i.e. safety issues). These aspects were reported 
above. 
The overall HMI was well accepted by 
controllers. A valuable suggestion made by 
controllers was that they would prefer to be able to 
enter clearance limits into labels, establishing a 
direct correlation between aircraft and their 
clearance limits (virtual stop bar positions). This 
would require, for example, an Electronic Flight 
Strip (EFS) system and has the advantage that the 
automation system is aware of the clearance limits. 
This information could be used for safety purposes. 
Thus, it was also recommended to investigate 
options for integration of Virtual Block Control and 
Separation Bubble concepts with an EFS system 
and to analyze the benefits for workload, safety and 
capacity. 
The experiments reported here did not include 
pilot awareness and opinions. The aspect of 
generation of clearance limits for pilots and their 
appreciation of Virtual Block and Separation 
Bubble control should thus be covered by cockpit 
simulations. 
Outlook 
Virtual Block Control and Separation Bubbles 
are simple and inexpensive improvements for tower 
ATC when proper A-SMGCS surveillance (MLAT 
and SMR) is present. They can be implemented 
rather easily and their use does not differ much 
from procedural control operations with real stop 
bars. Compared to the installation of real stop bars, 
virtual bars cost less and do not need to be installed 
on the airport surface. Virtual Blocks and 
Separation Bubbles are good candidates to mitigate 
effects of low visibility conditions on airport 
throughput and capacity in a safe and effective 
manner. 
Further evaluation of the VB and SB concepts 
will take place in the DLR Generic Cockpit 
Simulator (GECO) in Braunschweig in May 2009. 
GECO is a fixed-base flight simulator with a 180 
degrees collimated visual system. Four active 
airline pilots will take part in the simulations. They 
will taxi along with other simulated traffic in a 
Rotterdam Airport environment under VC3, while 
VB and SB procedures will be applied by a pseudo 
controller. The aim of these simulations is to find 
out whether pilots appreciate the concepts, how 
they perceive safety while operating under the 
given conditions, and how workload and situational 
awareness for the pilots change due to the new 
procedures. It will also be investigated whether 
intersections are sufficiently visible clearance limits 
for the pilots when taxiing in low visibility or 
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need to be installed on the taxiways for intermediate 
holding positions.  
The authors expect that further investigations 
of the tools will concentrate on operational safety 
aspects and the applicability of the tools at airports 
with a more complex taxiway structure. To this end, 
the already implemented Schiphol environment on 
the NARSIM Tower validation platform would 
offer an excellent testing ground and could lead to 
quick results. The authors further express the hope 
that research efforts in that direction are also 
incorporated into the SESAR programme to 
continue the promising efforts in studying low 
visibility tools and procedures.  
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AIM-s Assessing the Impact of Automation 
on Mental Workload (Short Version) 
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider 
APR Airport Operations Programme 
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement 
Guidance and Control Systems 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information 
Service 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
ATS Air Traffic Service 
CCIS Closed Circuit Information System 
CO Convoy Operations 
DLR Deutsches Zentrum für  
Luft- und Raumfahrt 
EDD Electronic Data Display 
EMMA European Movement Management by 
A-SMGCS 
GECO Generic Cockpit Simulator 
HMI Human-Machine Interface 
ICAO International Civil Aviation 
Organization 
LFV Luftfartsverket 
LVNL Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland 
ML Multiple Line-up 
MLAT Multilateration 
NARSIM NLR ATC Research Simulator 
NLR Nationaal Lucht- en 
Ruimtevaartlaboratorium 
NM Nautical Miles 
PP Parallel Push-backs 
R/T Radio Telephony 
RVR Runway Visual Range 
RWY Runway 
SB Separation Bubbles 
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SATI SHAPE Automation Trust Index 
SHAPE Solutions for Human Automation 
Partnership in European ATM 
SMGCS Surface Movement Guidance and 
Control Systems 
SMR Surface Movement Radar 
STCA Short-term Conflict Alert 
SUS System Usability Scale 
TAR Terminal Approach Radar 
TCM Taxiway Conflict Monitoring 
TMA Terminal Maneuvering Area 
TSD Traffic Situation Display 
TWY Taxiway 
UK United Kingdom 
VB Virtual Block Control 
VC Visibility Condition 
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